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From Excess Stimulus to
Monetary Mayhem
Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson
Three hundred years ago, the Scottish financier John Law
embarked on an interesting monetary experiment in France that
foreshadowed recent central bank policies. It included money cre-
ation, quantitative easing (QE), debt monetization, low interest rates
and audacious financial engineering. It worked for a while but then
collapsed. Large numbers of people were ruined, and Law fled the
country in disgrace.
Law’s mistake was to think that he could manufacture prosperity
by printing money. In the aftermath, difficult lessons were learned
about the dangers of the uncontrolled issue of paper currency and of
responding to short-term economic problems with wild monetary
experiments. France reverted to a metallic monetary system and the
resulting horror of paper currency and banks lasted a long time.
Those hard-won lessons were then forgotten. In the 1790s, France
embraced the Assignats with the same enthusiasm as she had earlier
embraced Law, and the result was another disaster. Similar episodes
recurred throughout the 19th century and prompted Sir Robert
Giffen (1892: 465) to observe:
For a good money is so very difficult a thing to get, and
Governments, when they meddle with money, are so apt to
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make blunders (and have, in fact, made such blunders without
end in the past, of which we have had somany illustrations lately
in the experience of the United States, the Argentine Republic,
Russia, and other countries), that a nation, which has a good
money should beware of its being tampered with, and especially
should beware of any change in the foundation—the standard
for money.
Forward to recent years and we have unlearned those lessons
again. Modern monetary policymakers are prone to make several
major intellectual errors. The first is their fixation with the belief that
if there is, or appears to be, inadequate macroeconomic perform-
ance, then that must be due to inadequate aggregate demand and
their only solution is to stimulate demand. Such thinking is reminis-
cent of the man with a hammer, to whom every problem looks like a
nail. Other diagnoses and solutions—such as the need to address
structural problems in the banking system and to address labor mar-
ket, tax and regulatory reform, and fiscal sustainability—are swept
under the carpet. Fundamental problems then remain unresolved,
and Keynesian policymakers are left wondering why their policies are
not working as they expected.
Their second intellectual error is deeper and might be described
as instrumentalism. Instead of seeing the monetary system as a spon-
taneous social order whose sole purpose is to serve its participants as
they go about their business, it sees the monetary system as some-
thing to be controlled for some allegedly higher end. So the interest
rate and the supply of money are not seen as the products of markets
but as control instruments to be determined by some central author-
ity. Analysis of the monetary system as a self-organizing social order
gives way to control and optimization analysis—that is, how best to
manipulate these “instruments” to achieve some arbitrary central
bank objective. In Herbert Frankel’s words, there is
the belief that a free monetary order is irrelevant and has now
become an anachronism, a relic of the past, and an impedi-
ment to the allegedly more “rational” policies of the present:
the free monetary order should be abolished wherever it has
not already been abolished. . . . It is surely significant that cur-
rently—even in the free world—the notion that people are
entitled to use money as they please, is regarded with consid-
erable scepticism [Frankel 1977: 4, 14].
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From this perspective, more instruments are always to be pre-
ferred to fewer, and the inbuilt constraints that protect a free
monetary order—such as constraints against the overissue of
money—are merely hindrances that prevent central banks from
achieving their objectives, that is, doing as they please.
Underlying this error are deeper ontological ones: they assume
that they understand the economy and presume to think that, if
they understand it, then they can control it (W. R. White 2015).
Unfortunately, they don’t understand how the economy works,
and they don’t know how to control it.
The Establishment of the Fed and the
Managed Monetary System
Before the Fed, prices, interest rates, and monetary aggre-
gates were constrained by the gold standard. Banks issued cur-
rency convertible to gold at a fixed price, monetary aggregates
were largely determined by the public demand to hold money,
and interest rates were determined by supply and demand in
financial markets—all subject to the rules of the gold standard.
There was no monetary policy and no central bank to operate
one. Once the Fed was established, however, it began to man-
age the system and, in so doing, to undermine it. As Ralph
Benko (2016) has observed, “Congress delegated weights and
measures to the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
which is doing a stunningly great job of it. Congress delegated
the power to regulate the value of the dollar to the Fed, which
is making a botch of it.”
To illustrate, according to official BLS CPI data, the U.S. dol-
lar had lost 83.2 percent of its 1914 purchasing power by the time
the last vestiges of the discipline of the gold standard were aban-
doned in 1971. Since then, thanks to the Fed, its purchasing
power has fallen by 95.8 percent relative to its 1914 purchasing
power.
Under the classical gold standard, interest rates were bounded
by the rate of time preference and the expected return on capital:
if they fell below the former, no one would lend, and if they went
above the latter, few would borrow. Interest rates were also highly
stable during the gold standard: government bond yields were
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generally between 2 percent and 4 percent.1 Over time, however,
the Fed acquired more control over interest rates—the most
important prices in a market economy—and for the last 45 years
they have been entirely determined by the whims of a committee,
the FOMC, and have been far more volatile. The Fed’s control
over interest rates led to wild swings as the Fed lurched from mon-
etary excess to restraint and back again, creating one boom-bust
cycle after another.
The Fed’s Serial Bubble Machine
Forward to 1996, and Alan Greenspan famously warned of
“irrational exuberance” in the stock markets before easing mon-
etary policy to stimulate them further. The “Greenspan put” pro-
tected investors on the downside, encouraging them to buy more
stocks and push up their prices. This policy was justified by the
belief that boosting the markets would create a wealth effect that
would stimulate consumption and growth, but it also encouraged
the speculative “greater fool” mentality to take hold, in which
people would knowingly buy overvalued assets in the belief that
some greater fool would buy them at higher prices. But market
fundamentals eventually reassert themselves, and the market
crashes.
The markets then boomed before crashing in 2001, only for
Greenspan and (later) Bernanke to repeat the process to produce
both another stock market boom and a housing boom, both of which
crashed in 2007–08. Bernanke then stoked up the biggest booms in
asset markets generally, including commodities, stocks, housing, and
junk and government bonds.
As Dan Thornton (2016) has pointed out, repeatedly doing the
same thing and expecting a different result the next time is literally
insane. The “everything bubble” is the biggest monetary experiment
ever, so why wouldn’t it also lead to the biggest ever collapse? It
appears that the Fed has set up the market for a fall.
1Short-term interest rates were more volatile, however, and indeed the system
was prone to short-term spikes and a series of crises. However, these problems
were due to the legal restrictions on the National Banking System and not to the
gold standard per se. Canada and the United Kingdom were also on the gold stan-
dard and did not experience such problems during this period.
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Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP)
One of the Fed’s main responses to the Global Financial Crisis
was to push interest rates to almost zero. The federal funds rate was
lowered from 5.25 percent in August 2007 to near zero by December
2008 and has not changedmuch since. ZIRP has a number of adverse
effects, however.
First, it encourages investors to take more risks to boost yields
(see, e.g., Thornton 2016). Investors are pushed out of safe fixed-
income positions into riskier positions such as stocks, real estate,
commodities, and structured products, which are often not appropri-
ate for them and whose true risks are not apparent because risk
spreads are suppressed as well.
Second, it encourages more borrowing and higher leverage. Many
companies have used low interest rates to load up on debt they don’t
need to reinvest in equity markets via M&A or share buybacks in
attempts to push up share prices further. As Soc Gen’s Andrew
Lapthorne recently noted, “The effect on U.S. nonfinancial balance
sheets is now starting to look devastating.”2 Low interest rates also
delay restructuring, by allowing zombies that would otherwise fail to
continue in operation, and encourage greater fiscal profligacy.
Third, low interest rates reduce financial returns, which puts pres-
sure on savers by making it more difficult to reach their savings tar-
gets. To illustrate, if ZIRP were implemented for a decade and
succeeded in pulling down returns on saving from 3 percent to zero
over that period, then the value of the fund would be 26 percent
lower by the end of that decade than it would have been. To indicate
the scale of losses involved, OECD data suggest U.S. pension fund
assets in 2009 were about $14.42 trillion, so a decade of ZIRP would
imply $2.54 trillion in accumulated lost returns—and this figure
ignores the losses on assets acquired in the interim, which could be
another trillion.3 These numbers also ignore losses to other forms of
2Quoted in Elliott (2016).
3A caveat is that, depending on their asset allocation strategies, pension funds
might benefit from ZIRP or QE-induced capital gains on their investments. For
conservative funds that invest mainly in bonds, however, these gains will be much
less than the losses indicated in the text. On the other hand, people who put their
entire pension fund in the stock market would have done well. Such considera-
tions reinforce the point that ZIRP and QE arbitrarily redistribute from safe
investors to those willing to take big risks.
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saving, which might easily be another one and a half trillion.4 The law
of compound interest implies that sustained ultra-low interest rates
have a devastating impact on savers and pension funds.
The conventional wisdom is that the lower the interest rate the
greater the stimulus to credit. The level of interest rates is a key profit
driver for all banks, however, and the lower the interest rate the
lower banks’ profitability from their main lines of business (e.g.,
spreads/carry, fees, liquidity, and trading). To quote a recent Fed
study: “Empirical analysis shows that low rates are contributing to
weaker NIMs [net interest margins] and identifies an adverse effect
that is materially larger when interest rates are low. It suggests that
these effects can be material for banks in some key advanced foreign
economies” (Claessens, Coleman, and Donnelly 2016).
ZIRP intensifies these profit-reduction effects. Banks’ profitability
is further reduced when the yield curve becomes flat or inverted, as
it now is in Japan. The flatter or more inverted the curve, the less
profitable is banks’ traditional core business of borrowing short term
to lend long term.5
ZIRP also discourages bank lending: there is little profit from
lending, so the supply of loans falls. We then see the drying up of
interbank lending, as there is little return to it. Meanwhile, the alter-
native of holding excess reserves on deposit at the Fed is all the more
attractive when the Fed pays interest on those reserves set at the
maximum of the Fed’s target range for the fed funds rate. In addi-
tion, the adoption of ZIRP was followed by a major fall in bank lend-
ing generally—it took more than five years for bank lending in real
terms to return to precrisis levels—and the contraction was especially
hard on small and medium enterprises. ZIRP thus intensified the
credit crunch rather than alleviated it.6
ZIRP has also failed to boost spending by reducing saving. The per-
sonal savings rate has gone up from 3 percent at the start of 2007 to
4Barrington (2014) offers an analysis that suggests that depositors alone lost
$784 billion in income over the five years of low interest rates, which number
would extrapolate to more than $1.5 trillion over a decade.
5For further empirical evidence that lower interest rates lead to lower NIMs, see,
e.g., the chart in Wheelock (2016).
6Sources: (a) Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks [BUSLOANS],
(b) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All
Items [CPIAUCSL]. Both retrieved from FRED, November 6, 2016.
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about 5.6 percent according to latest figures.7 The conventional view
that a lower interest rate will reduce saving is wrong. The explanation
is that individuals have future savings targets (e.g., pension income
targets)—because ultra-low interest rates havemade it muchmore dif-
ficult for them tomeet these targets, they respond by savingmore, even
though the returns are lower. The behavior of saving since the financial
crisis provides another illustration of how little mainstream economists
understand how the economy works, especially at ultra-low rates.
Putting these points together, it is clear that the major central
banks have fallen into a ZIRP trap. They implement ZIRP in themis-
taken belief that it will stimulate the economy and/or boost inflation.
However, ZIRP does not stimulate and central banks continue with
ZIRP (or worse, negative interest rate policy [NIRP]) in self-defeat-
ing attempts to produce a stimulus that ZIRP cannot produce. They
are then doomed to remain stuck in this trap until they realize their
error and see the way out—and there is no sign of that happening
anytime soon.
Quantitative Easing (QE)
A second pillar of unconventional monetary policy is large-scale
asset purchases, known as quantitative easing. When the program
unofficially started, on November 25, 2008, the Fed held $490 billion
worth of securities, all of which were Treasury obligations. When the
program ended in October 2014, its holdings had risen to $4.3 trillion,
comprising $2.5 trillion in Treasuries and $1.8 trillion in mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). The stated purpose of the program was to
reduce long-term yields to encourage investment and spending, and
so boost output and employment.8
7Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Saving Rate [PSAVERT],
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed
.org/series/PSAVERT, October 8, 2016.
8As Thornton (2015: 36) points out in a devastating critique, “It is disconcerting that
QE’s theoretical foundations evolved well after the basic structure of the program
was finalized [and] were, in fact, ex post rationalizations. What’s worse is that those
rationalizations were extraordinarily weak.” He also points out that they are based on
a discredited theory of the term structure and are empirically falsified. Moreover,
“there is virtually no credible evidence that QE led to persistent reductions in long-
term yields via the channels identified by the Fed. The fact that QE was not accom-
panied by any substantial increase in bank lending further undermines the possibility
that it stimulated economic activity” (ibid., p. 1). See also Thornton (2017).
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QE was accompanied by the payment of interest on excess
reserves (IOER), intended to neutralize the flood of excess reserves
that QE was creating. This combination of QE and IOER is best
understood not as monetary policy per se but as preferential credit
allocation policy. Such a policy, as Lawrence H. White (2015: 17)
notes, is a bad idea: it is “overreaching, wasteful, morally hazardous,
and fraught with serious governance problems.” White (2016:
360–61) explains further:
Credit allocation policy is a kind of central planning in which
Federal Reserve officials, risking not their own money but that
of taxpayers, substitute their judgment for [that of financial
market participants]. . . . When the Fed directs a larger share of
credit to one favored sector (like housing), more promising sec-
tors get smaller shares, a waste of scarce loanable funds on
lower-payoff investments. Fed-directed allocation of funds to a
declining industry throws good resources after bad. An increase
in political credit allocation reduces economic growth not only
by creating deadweight loss . . . , but by incentivizing socially
unproductive lobbying efforts to be among the favored credit
recipients. Especially if the Fed allocates funds to rescuing par-
ticular firms, it creates tremendous moral hazard and an envi-
ronment ripe for cronyism.
Targeted assistance is, however, a form of fiscal policy; and such deci-
sions properly belong to Congress.
All this buying achieved little benefit, except to Wall Street who
naturally loved it. The impact of QE was well described three years
ago by Andrew Huszar, a former Fed official in charge of
implementing QE1:
Even by the Fed’s sunniest calculations, aggressive QE over
five years has generated only a few percentage points of U.S.
growth. By contrast, experts outside the Fed, such as
Mohammed El Erian . . . suggest that the Fed may have cre-
ated and spent over $4 trillion for a total return of as little as
0.25 percent of GDP (i.e., a mere $40 billion bump in U.S.
economic output). Both of those estimates indicate that QE
isn’t really working. . . . The central bank continues to spin
QE as a tool for helping Main Street. But I’ve come to recog-
nize the program for what it really is: the greatest backdoor
Wall Street bailout of all time [Huszar 2013].
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The Failure of Stimulus
The failure of Fed policies to stimulate the economy is apparent
from a range of performance indicators. Some were highlighted in a
recent study by Porter et al. (2016):
• A long-term slowdown in the economic growth rate, which is
lower than at any time since the late 1940s and was only 1.6 per-
cent through the recent recovery.
• Job creation has fallen from an historical average of 2.1 percent
until the early noughties down to about 0.5 percent now, and
since 1990 there has been negligible growth inU.S. jobs exposed
to international competition.
• Labor force participation has declined from a high of nearly
78 percent in 1997 to about 73 percent.
• Real income is stagnant or declining, and median real income
is well below the peak it attained in 1990.
• Inequality is rising, and the Fed has contributed to rising
inequality in so far as its policies have redistributed from the
poor and savers to Wall Street types and high-net-worth
investors.
• A slowdown in small business formation: startups have fallen
from 11 percent of all firms in 2006 to just over 8 percent, and
small companies are no longer the leading job creator.
To these we might add other indicators of economic distress: the
U6 unemployment rate is 9.7 percent, almost double the official
unemployment rate of 4.9 percent; 34 percent of Americans don’t
have a dime and 69 percent have less than $1,000 in their bank
accounts; 65 percent of all children in the United States live in fami-
lies that get federal aid; and 46 million Americans use food banks.
The most worrying performance indicator of all is the collapse of
productivity growth. Between 1947 and 1973, labor productivity rose
at an annual rate of 3 percent. In the subsequent period to 2010, it fell
to 1.9 percent per annum—a fall that can possibly be attributed to the
growth in business regulation (Hutchinson 2016)—and it has since
plunged to 0.5 percent. Outside the United States, annual productiv-
ity growth in the United Kingdom averaged 2.2 percent from 1959 to
2007 but has since collapsed to 0.1 percent. In the eurozone, it
declined from 1.3 percent between 1995 and 2007 to 0.7 percent
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since. In Japan, manufacturing productivity growth was 2.5 percent
over 1990–2008 but has been minus 1.2 percent since then.9
Conversely, the productivity slowdown is far less in emerging mar-
kets, where interest rates have been kept at more normal levels.
According to the Conference Board’s Total Economy Database, annual
productivity growth inmajor emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, and Turkey), which averaged
4.9 percent in 1999–2006, has slowed only slightly to 4.2 percent in
2007–15 although there are signs of a further slowdown since 2013.
The correlation between extrememonetary policies and lousy pro-
ductivity figures is therefore unmistakable. We can now write a new
economic law, validated in four separate experiments, that, if you
maintain ultra-low interest rates for an extended period of time, you
will eventually get a collapse in productivity growth.
The most popular explanation—Robert Gordon’s theory (Gordon
2016) that technological advances are becoming more trivial so pro-
ductivity growth is declining long term—doesn’t fit the timescale.
The disappearance of productivity growth has happened too quickly
to be the result of technological senescence, and in any case techno-
logical change itself seems to be continuing at a brisk clip.
The explanation is that pushing interest rates well below their nat-
ural levels for a prolonged period distorts firms’ investment and
financing decisions and crowds out investments that boost labor pro-
ductivity. It encourages firms to borrow money to spend on buy-
backs, debt refinancing, and dividends; it promotes speculation
in financial, commodity, and real estate markets, especially when
investors believe that central banks will support these markets; it
encourages investments in large otherwise unviable projects; and it
encourages cash hoarding. At the same time, it discourages business
investments such as investments in new plants, R&D, and worker
training that would boost labor productivity.10
9Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics: Nonfarm labor productivity; U.K. Office for
National Statistics: Productivity Measures; Eurostat: Labor productivity; and
Japan Productivity Center: Manufacturing Productivity.
10BEA figures for net nonresidential fixed investment show a big fall after 2008,
and it took five years for it to recover to no more than a little over its 2008 value.
Since these numbers include the unviable big projects mentioned in the text, it is
clear that labor-productivity-supporting investment has fallen greatly. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment
[PNFIC96], retrieved from FRED, November 5, 2016.
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And what is the response from the world’s leading central
bankers? A little modesty, perhaps? Not a bit. To cite Mario Draghi,
in remarks made on April 21, 2016, there is little alternative to the
ECB’s course of money printing and low interest rates in a world
where economic prospects are dim.11 Yet we have been awash with
vast stimulus programs for nearly a decade and now find ourselves in
a world of poor prospects despite all that effort. 12
Unsustainability of Unconventional Monetary Policies
Unconventional policies have not just failed; they are not sustain-
able either. Part of the reason is that central banks cannot eliminate
risks; instead, they can only suppress them temporarily at the cost of
making the eventual crisis worse. As Bloomberg’s Richard Breslow
observes:
A portfolio built to only withstand stress thanks to central
bank intervention is one destined to blow-up spectacularly.
The embedded flaw . . . is that central banks give investors
perfect foresight. And nothing can go wrong. . . . You don’t
need to be a Taleb or Mandelbrot to calculate that we have
been having once in a hundred year events on a regular basis
for the last thirty years [quoted in Durden 2016a].
Historical experience suggests that risks are actually greatest
when measured risks—such as risk spreads and volatilities—are
at their lowest and people start wondering where all the risks
have gone.
There are additional reasons to think that current policies cannot
go on indefinitely and policymakers are now holding a tiger by the
tail. Many informed observers have been warning for years that the
build up of debt is unsustainable. If one thinks about a crisis as a
11Cited in Karanyi and O’Donnell (2016).
12We do not have space to discuss the impact of the uncertainty the Fed has gen-
erated. As Dorn (2015) points out, “The path of monetary policy is based on pure
discretion and is data dependent; there is no monetary rule to guide policy.
Forward guidance has not worked to calm markets, and Fed watching has
become obsessive.” Nor have we discussed the intractable lack-of-knowledge and
incentive problems facing central banks. For more on these important subjects,
see Thornton (2015), White (2012), and O’Driscoll (2016a, 2017).
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period of deleveraging, there has been no deleveraging since 2007.
Indeed, a recent IMF report (IMF 2016) states that current debt
levels are a record 225 percent of world GDP, well up on 2007.
These create a headwind against global recovery, pose a major risk to
financial stability, and imply that macroeconomic policymakers have
run out of ammo to counter a renewed downturn. Come the next
recession, it will become obvious that many of these debts cannot be
repaid and we will be looking at debt forgiveness or defaults on a
large scale.
No Exit?
If current monetary policy is unsustainable, it is not clear how the
Fed could restore monetary normality. There may be no safe exit
either, and the Fedmay have trapped itself in a QE-forever cycle. An
exit strategy requires that the Fed raise interest rates to normal
levels, but the mechanics of raising interest rates are far from
straightforward.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Fed would raise its target fed
funds rate and use open-market operations to keep interest rates
within their target range. However, the Fed’s response to the crisis
has led to a situation where the fed funds market has become largely
irrelevant. For example, the Fed could use interest on reserves and
reverse repurchase agreements as an offer to borrow back Federal
Reserve deposits at its desired rate, and this offer would put a floor
under the fed funds rate. When the Fed raises its offer rate, the fed
funds rate should go up with it, and the success of the Fed’s opera-
tion to raise the target fed funds range from 0–0.25 percent to
0.25–0.5 percent in December 2015 demonstrates that the mecha-
nism works. Unfortunately, the fed funds market is now largely dis-
connected from other markets, and market yields fell after the
December rate rise. The Fed thus lacks reliable instruments to
influence interest rates generally. If inflation expectations were to
rise, which is likely, then market interest rates would likely rise and
the Fed would have difficulty reasserting control over them.13




To quote O’Driscoll (2016b), “The misalignment between market
expectations and Fed capabilities is very dangerous, and I fear it will
not end well.”
Even if the Fed could raise rates, there is also the problem of how
to raise them without triggering a crisis.14 A rise in interest rates
would increase financing costs and the cost of debt service, and
impose a major strain on highly leveraged companies and individuals,
many of whom would be bankrupted. Higher interest would also put
financial pressure on governments and could prompt bankruptcies at
municipal or even state level.
Higher interest rates would inflict enormous losses, too. Fed
policies have pushed investors into the long end of the curve in
their search for yield, but low interest rates and longer matu-
rity imply greater duration and greater exposure. To give an
idea of possible losses, a recent Goldman article quoted in
Durden (2016b) suggested that a 100–basis points rise in inter-
est rates might produce a loss close to $1 trillion or about
5 percent of U.S. GDP.15 A rise to normal interest rates would
suggest losses of $3 trillion to $4 trillion and other estimates
14In comparison, the task of reducing the Fed’s balance sheet is easier,
e.g., it could allow assets to mature without rolling them over. Reducing the
Fed’s balance sheet is highly desirable because it would remove the distor-
tions in asset prices and credit allocation created by its current bloated bal-
ance sheet. Our best guess, however, is that, as the Fed gradually realizes
that it does not have to reduce its balance sheet, it will renege on its prom-
ises to reduce it to precrisis levels: “The FOMC will continue to distort
markets until, by some as-yet-unknown magic, those markets return to nor-
mal” (Thornton 2015: 25). It will then increasingly see its balance sheet as a
useful way to target assistance to particular economic sectors or asset classes,
as and when it deems such assistance to be necessary. The size and compo-
sition of its balance sheet will then be promoted as additional policy tools,
and the Fed will argue that its balance sheet-to-GDP ratio is actually quite
low relative to other major central banks. Come the next crisis, the Fed
would further ratchet up its balance sheet and soon be looking at a Japan-
style scenario, of which more below.
15The math is easily verified using the back-of-the-envelope modified duration
formula, i.e., the loss is approximately notional exposure times modified duration
times the change in basis points. With a modified duration of 5.6 and an exposure
of $17 trillion, then a 100–basis point increase in interest rates would lead to a
loss of $950 billion.
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are considerably higher.16 And these are only the losses to
bondholders.17
Financial markets are now highly correlated—one might even say
that the only asset that now matters is the 10-year Treasury note.
A sharp rise in interest rates would then have major adverse effects
on other asset markets, and all the asset price bubbles that the Fed
has blown since the crisis would likely burst. Large pools of institu-
tional capital have also become accustomed to strategies based on
short-term returns and relative performance. Such strategies pro-
duce steady returns and the appearance of low risk but leave
investors highly exposed to a major market move and prime the mar-
kets for a black swan event. As hedge fund manager Mark Spitznagel
notes, “All assets are very much correlated. I think there is just one
big bet out there, so diversification isn’t going to work.” With “low
rates and high stock valuations [markets] are extraordinarily sensitive
to changes in rates.” Any significant increase in rates could cause
markets to “go down very, very hard” (quoted in Durden 2016c).
Many of these exposures are also poorly hedged. Leaving aside
that manymarket participants have never experienced a hike in inter-
est rates, it is difficult to design a hedging strategy against interest-
rate risk because interest rates have been so stable—that is, they
don’t have the data to calibrate a hedge. Risk models are difficult to
calibrate for the same reason, making them useless when it comes to
anticipating the consequences of the out-of-sample events that mat-
ter. Indeed, risk models wouldmakemarket instability worse. Should
any event trigger major losses, model-based risk management strate-
gies would respond by sell-offs to get the risk numbers back down,
16The same article also suggested that the total face value of all U.S. bonds might
be as high as $40 trillion, in which case the loss from a 100–basis points rise would
be well over $2 trillion. Whitehouse (2015) suggests that the same rise in interest
rates might produce a loss of $3 trillion. One would also get bigger losses with
higher duration numbers, and an anonymous post on the Wall Street Journal
website suggested that Treasuries might have an average modified duration as
high as 7.79.
17Higher interest rates would also inflict major capital losses on the Fed itself.
Torres, Zumbrun, and Gage (2013) suggested that it could face losses of half a
trillion dollars, and one can easily carry out duration analyses that produce even
bigger numbers. Losses on this scale would more than wipe out the Fed’s
$40.2 billion capital and render it insolvent on paper. They would also trigger
awkward questions from Congress, but doubtless the Fed would just tough it
out—negative capital does not hinder a central bank’s ability to function because
it can always print more money.
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and these would create a positive-feedback loop that could greatly
intensify a market downturn. In addition, most Wall Street risk mod-
els are still using Gaussian assumptions and back-calculating volatil-
ity based on recent data. As set out in our book Alchemists of Loss
(Dowd and Hutchinson 2010), this will provide a double whammy in
a crisis, of volatility being much higher than that assumed and secu-
rities moving by amounts far greater than suggested by Gaussian
models, even plugging in the higher new volatility.
If we add to these considerations that market liquidity is fragile,
interconnections are not well understood, and many risks have
migrated outside the regulated perimeter, it is abundantly clear that
any attempt to restore interest rates to normal levels could have awk-
ward repercussions.
Bear in mind the recent bond market “tantrums” in which the
adverse market reactions to modest tightening or even rumors of
such led central banks to postpone further attempts for fear of pro-
voking sell-offs, and the scale of the practical difficulties it faces is all
too clear.
The Fed is then boxed in. It needs to raise interest rates to restore
monetary normality but can’t feasibly do so, and the longer it delays
the worse the underlying misallocation and risk exposure problems
become. In the meantime, the choice remains what it always was—
a bad downturn now or worse later—and the clock is ticking.
Ramping-Up QE
The danger is that the Fed would respond as it usually does by
reaching out for additional policy instruments that it has not yet tried.
Each of these has the potential to create unprecedented mischief,
monetary and otherwise.
The first is to ramp-up QE, but this experiment has already been
tried big time in Japan and failed. Indeed, Japan entered the finan-
cial crisis with an already bloated central bank balance sheet roughly
as big relative to GDP as the Fed’s is today. It has since risen to
90.5 percent of GDP, having nearly tripled in less than three years.
This enormous stimulus achieved little beneficial effect—
unemployment fell a little, but growth was negligible. To state the
obvious: if QE on this scale didn’t work in Japan, there is no reason
to think it would work anywhere else.
It did, however, have a number of adverse effects. Leaving aside
plummeting productivity, a greatly expanded central bank balance
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sheet greatly expands the problems of arbitrary redistribution, misal-
location, and the undermining of market processes that are inherent
in QE. Consider two examples.
The BOJ’s bond purchases are on such a scale that it has cornered
the market and is struggling to find further bonds to buy. These pur-
chases distort interest rates across the yield curve and mean that
Japanese financial institutions are increasingly assessing bonds on the
basis of their likelihood of being bought by the BOJ rather than on
the basis of the creditworthiness of their issuers. Bond prices don’t
matter either: even if bonds promise subzero yields, financial institu-
tions will still buy them because they can be confident of selling them
on to the BOJ at higher prices.
The BOJ, aka the Tokyo Whale, is a top 10 shareholder in 90 per-
cent of Nikkei 225 stocks and is well on the way to becoming the
biggest shareholder in the country—it is gradually nationalizing the
stock market. “For those who want shares to go up at any cost, it’s
absolutely fantastic that the BOJ is buying so much,” said Shingo Ide,
chief strategist for the NLI Research Institute in Tokyo. “This is
clearly distorting the sanity of the stock market” (quoted in
Nakamura, Kitanaka, and Sano 2016). Stock prices are supposed to
reflect the underlying value of a company and to be priced correctly;
equities should reflect earnings and other fundamentals, not the
whims of central bankers on a buying binge. Instead, the market is
becoming detached from fundamentals and the BOJ is creating an
enormous bubble.
The knock-on effects in both stock and bond markets include the
promotion of a greater fool mentality, the undermining of price dis-
covery and market liquidity, the undercutting of efforts to make pub-
lic companies more efficient, and doubts about the BOJ’s ability as
top stakeholder to hold corporate governance to account. If these
policies continue, then it is only a matter of time before the BOJ
owns the entire market.
An additional worry is that even a small sell-off could scare
investors and provoke a flight from the yen. In fact, the BOJ didn’t
even achieve its own monetary policy objectives of boosting inflation
and pushing down the yen. Instead, inflation fell and the yen
strengthened. The latter would appear to be in a bubble too.
Despite these failures, Japanese monetary policymakers remain
fixated on stimulus. Their latest policy shift is to peg Japanese govern-
ment 10-year bond yields at zero, giving up any attempt to control
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the size of their own balance sheet and throwing monetary control
out of the window. As for the government’s enormous (about
250 percent) debt-to-GDP ratio, Keynesian commentators are now
suggesting that the central bank should buy up government debt and
write it off—that is, provide government with a “helicopter drop.”
We will come back to this proposal a little later, but either of these
policies paves the way for the unlimited expansion of the BOJ’s bal-
ance sheet, and we all know how that would end. The last remaining
constraints against the overissue of base money are being kicked
away as Japanese policymakers become increasingly delusional.
Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP)
The second proposal is NIRP, and the argument usually made is
that NIRP would stimulate the economy by encouraging people to
spend instead of save. This argument, however, fails to learn from
ZIRP’s failure to stimulate. That it might not be the best of ideas is
suggested by NIRP’s having had no precedent in 5,000 years of
recorded history and having been badly received where it has been
tried in Europe and Japan (Freeman 2016).
NIRP means that you get paid to borrow and you pay to lend. But
if I have to pay to lend, why would I lend at all? NIRP encourages
investors to flee from their traditional safe haven, bonds, into cash or
into nonfinancial assets. That is the main reason why NIRPers want
to abolish cash. NIRP also creates an incentive to make payments
quickly and collect them slowly, so, e.g., you rush to pay your taxes
but the government doesn’t want you to, and one can envisage that
NIRP would create an “epochal outburst of socially unproductive—
even if privately beneficial—financial innovation” along such lines
(Garbade and McAndrews 2012). Another example of the weirdness
of NIRP was highlighted by Richard Rahn (2016): “If government
can borrow at negative or close to zero interest rates and endlessly
roll over their debts, it makes no sense to tax [rather than borrow].”
To implement NIRP is to enter a bizarre twilight zone in which noth-
ing works as it should. The NIRPers have not even begun to think it
through.
If NIRP were implemented, would it lead people to spend more,
as intended? We doubt it. Preliminary evidence suggests that NIRP
in other countries is failing to encourage more spending (Kantchev,
Whittall, and Inada 2016). Instead, people tend to save more to meet
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their pension targets and because NIRP undermines their confi-
dence. Even if people were to spend more in the short term, it is still
difficult to see how a sustained policy of taxing bank reserves or
deposits, which is what NIRP would do, could stimulate spending.
Moreover, it is NIRP’s anti-stimulative nature that explains why its
adoption in Japan led to a stronger yen and lower inflation. The evi-
dence from overseas also indicates that NIRP has hammered bank
stocks, undermining banks’ ability to lend and again producing an
effect that is anything but stimulative.
What about the impact of NIRP on inflation, expected inflation,
and expected real interest rates? Leave aside that no one knows
much about the interconnection between these variables in a ZIRP
or (especially) NIRP world, and there is another problem—such a
policy is trying to reduce expected real interest rates, which are
already too low and probably negative. Low/negative real returns are
a disincentive to capital accumulation, however, and pursued long-
term would have profoundly destructive effects on the capital stock.
Or do NIRPers instead intend that the inflation rate should fall from
current positive levels down to levels sufficiently below their
proposed negative interest rates to make expected real returns high
enough to encourage resumed capital accumulation? If so, how do
they propose to make the switchover to positive real rates, and what
about their current inflation targeting mandates?
Negative interest rates would also have serious adverse effects on
the financial system. As Chris Whalen (2016) recently pointed out,
Negative numbers do not exist in the natural world . . . only in
the theoretical realm inhabited by economists. Negative inter-
est rates are deleterious to the well-being of financial institu-
tions, commercial enterprises and consumers. Negative
interest rates suggest liquidation, destroy the capital stock and
ultimately cause a shrinkage in the amount of credit.
We would go further: sustained NIRP would destroy the financial
system. It wouldmake banks’ core businessmodel unviable, especially
where the yield curve becomes inverted. However strong they might
currently be, NIRP would turn banks into loss-making entities that
must eventually fail. Defined-benefit pension schemes would also
become unviable, as negative returns would mean that they could not
meet their long-term commitments. Asset managers, hedge funds,
and even insurance companies would become unviable too.
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At the most fundamental level, negative interest rates are a dread-
ful idea because they penalize thrift and reward impetuousness. They
are the epitome of institutionalized short-termism, in which we are
encouraged to “live for today” when any reasonable person can see
that we shouldn’t. There is a reason why historical interest rates have
always been positive, and it is called time preference. Negative inter-
est rates are an offence against the law of time preference, and to
mess with that is to unleash a monetary pandemonium the adverse
consequences of which we have barely begun to appreciate.
To NIRPers, however, the zero lower bound is not a boundary but
an obstacle to be kicked aside so omniscient central bankers can
ramp up their monetary experiments in a misguided effort to gamble
their way out of the consequences of their previous mistakes.
Banning Cash
Let us suppose, nonetheless, that the monetary authorities decide
onNIRP. They then run into a constraint: if central banks push inter-
est rates too far into negative territory, bank depositors and bond
investors would switch into cash to obtain a zero return instead.18
A serious effort at NIRP therefore needs to be enabled by blocking
this escape route—that is, by abolishing cash. Central bankers could
then impose whatever negative interest rates they wish, and we
would all have to put up with it.
However, those who would ban cash usually ignore the substantial
costs that proposal entails. An example is the impact on the extreme
poor. According to a recent study by Shaefer and Edin (2012), in
2011 there were over 4 million people in the United States who live
on less than two dollars a day. These include the indigent and many
who are poorly educated and mentally ill—that is, the most vulnera-
ble, who are completely dependent on the cash economy. There are
18Strictly speaking, the decision whether to keep deposits in the bank or withdraw
them as cash depends on the carry costs of currency and on the nonpecuniary
benefits of deposits versus cash. The former potentially include the costs of stor-
age, safekeeping, handling, and transportation; and the latter include the benefits
of direct access to the electronic payments system. So ignoring differences in
carry costs for the sake of illustration, bank deposits have the advantage over cash
that they can be directly used for electronic payments systems, whereas cash can-
not. The upshot is that most people would be willing to accept a small negative
interest rate on their deposits before converting to cash, but as interest rates fall
further, people will definitely convert to cash.
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also those who have chosen to hold much of their wealth in the form
of cash, including many foreigners, for whom holdings of U.S. dollars
are a protection against financial repression in their own countries.
Banning cash would expropriate much or all of their wealth.
Banning cash has wider implications, too. Once people are forced
to rely solely on digital bank currency, then all transactions would be
monitored and only those of which the state approves would be per-
mitted. The state would then acquire much greater control over
everyone’s lives. All financial holdings would be vulnerable to gov-
ernment predation, and the state would have the ultimate means of
control. Any remaining citizens’ rights to financial privacy—surely, a
basic human right—would be destroyed. With no other access to
their money, anyone targeted by the state couldn’t hide, couldn’t
resist, and couldn’t escape. The loss of financial privacy implies a
huge loss of civil liberties.
Moreover, once such powers are conceded to the state, it is
unreasonable not to expect proposals to use that power to achieve
other supposedly useful objectives. Indeed, one of the other rea-
sons put forward for abolishing cash is to make life difficult for
“bad guys” such as drug dealers. The suppression of cash then
becomes a weapon in the war against drugs, terror, tax evasion,
and so on.19
We would suggest more targeted approaches to such issues. In the
case of drugs, we might reconsider prohibition; in the case of terror-
ism, we might reconsider security and foreign policies; and, in the
case of tax evasion, we might consider tax reform. It is surely simplis-
tic to argue that, just because bad guys use cash, we should ban it for
everyone. By that logic, every single amenity that we use should be
banned because bad guys use them, too.
19Those who would ban cash also make the implicit assumption that cash is the
vehicle of choice for the bad guys, but it is not. A recent U.K. government report
suggested that banks and accounting firms pose the highest risks of facilitating
illicit transactions. To point out the obvious: (1) these are regulated already, so
the problem is really regulatory failure rather than the availability of cash, and
(2) the ban-cash logic would then suggest that it would make more sense to ban
these than to ban cash. That same report also suggested that the costs of this crim-
inal activity were £24 billion, which is not much more than 1 percent of GDP.
Thus, the losses involved are fairly small and could be reversed by sensible tax
reforms, but these are not on the agenda.
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Forcing everyone to use state-controlled digital currency also
makes it much easier for the state to pursue sado-economic poli-
cies in which it punishes anyone it does not like—savers, rentiers,
and dissidents are obvious targets. There is, too, the danger that
the control apparatus would be hijacked by some group with a con-
trol agenda, e.g., “health fascists.” Too much tobacco, alcohol,
sugar, carbs, etc. are bad for our health; so why not use the state’s
power to control how much we spend on these items? Everyone
then ends up on a state-controlled diet prescribed by whoever the
state declares knows best.
Printing Money
The last throw of the dice is to “print money”—a one-off increase
or a series of increases in the supply of base money. One variant is
to monetize government debt. Proponents suggest that the Fed has
done lots of QE and inflation is still low, so why not go all the way
and use QE to buy up the rest of the publicly held government
debt? Since Treasury debt held by the public is about 80 percent of
GDP, such a policy would produce a massive increase in the amount
of money held by the public. Unless one believes that all of the
newly issued base money would end up as excess reserves in the
banking system, one must suppose that most/all of the newly issued
base money would end up as currency in circulation, implying that
the latter would increase about tenfold. There would then be a big
increase in spending and prices would rise; interest rates would lift
and encourage existing excess reserves to flood out of the banking
system and further boost the currency in circulation. There would
then be a period of sharp inflation, and prices would rise by at least
tenfold. Whether they subsequently stabilized or continued to rise
would depend on whether the debt monetization policy was a one-
off or not.
The ultimate way to print money is via a helicopter drop—the
central bank issues base money and gives it away to the public or uses
it to finance pet projects. Helicopter money is a bad policy for at least
three reasons.
It fosters the illusion of a “free lunch,” which distracts policymak-
ers from the more difficult but necessary issues—such as the need
for structural, fiscal, and monetary reforms. Rational policy is impos-
sible in a world in which policymakers operate under such an illusion.
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Another problem is that helicopter money intrudes on decisions
that are fiscal in nature. Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann
made this point in a recent interview:
The question of whether and how money is given away to the
general public is a highly political one that would need to be
addressed by governments and parliaments. Central banks
don’t have a mandate to do so, not least because it would
mean redistributing assets on a huge scale. It would be noth-
ing short of unreservedly commingling monetary and fiscal
policy, a step which would be incompatible with the notion of
central bank independence [Weidmann 2016].
These considerations lead to the third and biggest problem with
helicopter money, namely, that it threatens to destroy altogether any
last remaining constraints against the overissue of base money. If hel-
icopter money is tried and is perceived to have been a success, there
will be pressure to repeat the operation; if it fails, there will be calls
to escalate the program because it wasn’t tried on a big enough scale.
A powerful constituency will have been created that benefits from
“free” money. This constituency encompasses not only Congress but
all the special interest groups that might lobby Congress—that is,
everyone who might want “free” money. There will then be enor-
mous pressure on the Fed to expand the program, and there is poten-
tially no limit to the demand for such finance: the supply of
(supposedly) worthwhile projects to be financed at (supposedly) zero
cost is infinite.
Instead, we should listen to the advice of the German hard-money
economists. As Weidmann (2016) points out,
Instead of raising the prospect of ever more daredevil feats [on
the part of monetary policy], it would actually be wise to pause
for thought. Monetary policy isn’t a panacea—it can’t replace
urgently needed reforms in individual countries, nor can it solve
Europe’s growth problems. That would simply be too much of a
tall order, and it would most certainly end in tears.
Otmar Issing (2016) is even more scathing: Helicopter money “is
nothing less than a monetary policy declaration of bankruptcy. A
central bank that is throwing out money for free will hardly be able
to regain control of the printing press.”
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We can also imagine a truly dystopian monetary future in which
these policies are implemented jointly. The central bank engages
in massive QE and buys everything up. Cash is banned, and there
is no longer any financial privacy. NIRP is implemented, and
returns go negative. The major financial institutions—banks,
insurance companies, hedge funds, and pension funds—are
bankrupted. The banks are taken over as government-run utilities,
and old-age provision becomes a state monopoly. A deflationary
spiral is avoided by large-scale money printing. If private accumu-
lation of capital is falling, print helicopter money to finance pub-
licly owned investment funds. Want more infrastructure? Have a
pet project? Want to eliminate public debt? Print more money.
Fiscal and monetary policy is then driven by the illusion that heli-
copter money is “free,” and it becomes the dominant policy instru-
ment. All constraints to protect sensible finance and sound money
go out of the window, and the value of the currency goes to its
intrinsic commodity value, nothing.
Conclusion: Bad Monetary Ideas Lead to
Bad Monetary Outcomes
There is no idea so preposterous that some monetary economist
somewhere won’t seize upon it as a panacea. Run it through some
central bank research department, and it emerges as a “serious” pol-
icy proposal. Have it proposed by some central bank governor, and it
becomes the preferred solution. QE, ZIRP, NIRP, banning cash, and
helicopter money are all examples. These are all bad ideas that can-
not but lead to bad outcomes. This orgy of irresponsible monetary
experimentation cannot last, and the endgame will not be pleasant.
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